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Few cities in South Asia have been affected by 
violence more than Karachi, Pakistan’s largest 
city and economic centre. This working paper 
examines the impacts of the city’s declining 
security situation on the control and contestation 
of public space. It focuses specifically on the 
efforts of public and private actors to protect 
themselves through the widespread use of physical 
barriers as a form of conflict infrastructure. To 
help provide a way forward, recommendations 
are presented for planning and managing barriers 
more effectively and equitably, and for supporting 
alternative means of security for the poorest and 
most insecure groups. Particular attention is paid 
to the city’s ethnic and religious/sectarian politics 
and the limited capacity of the authorities, and their 
difficulties in maintaining neutrality in attempting 
to intervene. 
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In its recent past, Karachi has experienced recurrent 
waves of violence and terrorism. The structural causes 
behind the city’s predicament are multifarious, but have 
been strongly influenced by national political instability, 
regional conflict associated with the Afghan war, 
and migration and ethnic violence accompanying the 
partitioning of India. As a major port city, Karachi has 
also become a strategic hub for the Afghan heroin trade, 
an asylum for migrants and refugees, and an entry point 
for arms and munition destined for Afghanistan. Rising 
urban poverty and unemployment (particularly among 
youth), ethno-political tensions, socio-spatial divisions, 
and governance failures have combined with these 
external factors to create the conditions conducive 
to various forms of violent conflict – ethno-political, 
sectarian, militant and criminal – throughout the city.
This working paper examines the impacts of violent 
conflict on the control and contestation of public 
space in Karachi. It focuses specifically on the efforts 
of public and private actors to enhance safety and 
security through the use of physical barriers as a form 
of conflict infrastructure. Case studies were undertaken 
to document these efforts in different parts of the city 
using field surveys and photographic documentation, 
silent probe and observation, and key informant 
interviews augmented by a literature review. Workshops 
with key stakeholders engaged in security and urban 
planning were also held during the research to galvanise 
interest in the findings and their implications for urban 
policy and practice.
The paper begins by analysing the major historical 
factors that have contributed to Karachi’s declining 
safety and security situation and its spatial impacts. 
This includes a focus on the city’s geographic location, 
urban migration and ethnic partitioning, and planning 
failure and informality. The different spaces affected by 
violent conflict are then outlined. They include secluded 
peri-urban spaces; low-income neighbourhoods 
(including katchi abadis, or informal settlements); polling 
stations (when general or municipal elections are held); 
apartment buildings; land; business and marketplaces; 
streets and public spaces; places of worship; 
educational institutions; and spaces where women face 
various forms of everyday violence.
These spaces reflect significant state failures in the 
realms of security and urban planning, which have also 
allowed public and private actors to intervene informally.
Physical barriers are the most visible and widespread 
interventions that have been deployed. Other 
interventions include surveillance systems used to 
monitor suspicious behaviour and symbolic mechanisms 
(eg posters, banners and wall chalking) used to 
delineate territorial control and demarcate authority 
and political affiliation in contested localities. These 
mechanisms have resulted in a number of distinct 
spatial manifestations:
•	 Forced cul-de-sacs occur where arm levers, iron 
gates and, in more unusual cases, walls, have blocked 
public streets, creating dead ends. They tend to 
be concentrated around gated neighbourhoods/
apartment blocks, high profile residences, markets, 
religious gathering spaces, and culturally/politically 
significant institutions. Forced cul-de-sacs protect 
residents and other beneficiaries from unknown 
pedestrians and vehicles, but have burdened the 
general public by reducing accessibility and freedom 
of movement. They have also prevented informal 
vendors from entering neighbourhoods, adversely 
affecting their livelihoods.
•	 Disrupted footpaths occur where concrete barriers, 
cargo containers, metal spikes, reinforced concrete 
walls, bollards, and sand bags have encroached onto 
sidewalks. They tend to be concentrated around the 
boundary walls of significant institutions, police and 
ranger posts and stations, hotels, embassies and 
consulates, and prisons. Footpaths are disrupted in 
order to protect residences and institutions against 
potential intrusions, but this also creates additional 
hazards for pedestrians by forcing them into traffic.
•	 Restricted thoroughfares occur where cargo 
containers, concrete blocks, and temporarily parked 
buses have blocked access to major streets. 
Restricted thoroughfares permit the control of 
pedestrian and vehicular access by residents and the 
authorities, but impede accessibility and mobility, and 
create additional hazards for pedestrians.
Executive summary
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•	 Privately controlled public spaces occur where 
boundary walls, metal grills, cargo containers, and 
concrete blocks have encroached public spaces. They 
tend to be concentrated around residences of political 
leaders, public offices and gated communities. 
Privately controlled public spaces protect those they 
were designed for, but they remove space from the 
public realm, effectively privatising its control and 
management.
•	 Diminishing green strips and medians occur where 
walls, iron grills and metal fences have encroached 
spaces often used for the provision of municipal 
services (eg refuse collection) and utilities (eg 
electricity) or for landscaping. These spaces are 
increasingly being taken over by property owners for 
the purposes of enhancing security. In effect, barriers 
are being used to privately occupy and illegally 
acquire public space.
•	 Gated neighbourhoods occur where walls, iron 
gates, and arm levers form protective compounds 
around communities. They have become the norm for 
most higher-income developments, including many 
apartment blocks. While gated neighbourhoods 
protect and insulate residents from outside security 
threats (real and perceived), they contribute to the 
social divisions that fuel ethno-political violence. 
They also contribute to the inequitable provision 
of infrastructure where municipalities approve and 
in some instances co-finance barriers and other 
improvements for higher-income, but not lower-
income, neighbourhoods. 
•	 Secluded peri-urban spaces include low-income 
neighbourhoods where flags, banners and wall 
chalking are used by gangs, mafias and other armed 
groups for the purposes noted above. Ad hoc barriers 
(eg felled electricity poles) are also often deliberately 
placed across roads and access points to deter 
police and outsiders from entering. The relatively high 
densities and narrow paths and streets also form 
indirect barriers, making these neighbourhoods less 
accessible and more secluded.
The paper concludes with recommendations aimed 
at planning and managing physical barriers in more 
effective and equitable ways, and at promoting 
alternative security mechanisms for the poorest and 
most insecure groups. Both recommendations adopt a 
spatial lens in addressing insecurity and its effects on 
different communities and groups of people. But they 
also address the limited capacity of the authorities, and 
their difficulties in maintaining neutrality in attempting to 
intervene. These recommendations are twofold:
Support local platforms for planning and managing 
physical barriers more equitably – Physical barriers 
have become an irreversible reality, even though most 
are illegal. Subsequent efforts by the Sindh government 
to remove illegal barriers have been vigorously 
contested by ordinary citizens and other stakeholders 
demanding alternative means of security before their 
removal. Many residents in planned neighbourhoods 
believe that in the absence of a non-partisan and 
efficient local government and policing system, the 
status of their safety and security will be compromised. 
In their view, removal of barriers may not be a wise 
option in the present circumstances.
In the absence of alternatives, physical barriers should 
be planned and managed in ways that maximise their 
benefits and minimise their burdens for all affected 
groups. As the agency responsible for the provision 
of municipal services, the Karachi Metropolitan 
Corporation (KMC) has a clear role in coordinating the 
planning efforts required to achieve this objective. This 
requires closer engagement with the Sindh Building 
Control Authority (SBCA), which is responsible for 
enforcing building regulations, but which lacks the 
capacity and political will to do so. The intention to re-
instate local elections despite continued postponements 
presents an ongoing important opportunity to empower 
municipal institutions to engage in more accountable, 
representative and less politicised urban planning and 
governance processes. However, the extent to which 
municipal institutions would be able to address these 
issues without getting caught up in the city’s ethnic 
politics remains to be seen.
Co-produce citizen-police security solutions at the 
community level – The Sindh government established 
Citizen-Police Liaison Committees (CPLCs) in 1989 
to bridge the gap between the police and citizens. 
CPLCs provide critical inputs into law enforcement and 
have proven effective in enhancing security, including 
in lower-income neighbourhoods. Holding municipal 
elections would present another opportunity for locally 
elected councilors and the mayor of Karachi to liaise 
with the authorities to enhance local representation, 
accountability and community engagement in policing.
However, reaching security solutions that are both 
politically unbiased and socially equitable will ultimately 
depend in large part on whether the city’s enduring 
ethno-religious/sectarian politics can be transcended 
by stronger and more accountable local institutions 
(particularly those governing planning and policing). 
If these institutions can be fostered through local 
elections, then Karachi could have a real chance 
of planning and managing physical barriers and 
other security mechanisms in more effective and 
equitable ways.
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1 
Introduction
Karachi is the most populous city in Pakistan, with about 
20 million inhabitants, making it one of the largest mega-
cities in the world (Hasan et al. 2015). Karachi is also 
Pakistan’s economic centre, contributing 25 per cent of 
gross domestic product (GDP), managing 95 per cent 
of the country’s international trade, and accounting for 
70 per cent of national income tax revenue (Yusuf 2012).
However, Karachi’s livability and prosperity have been 
seriously threatened by recurrent waves of violence 
and terrorism (Yusuf 2012). The structural causes 
behind the city’s predicament are multifarious, but 
have been strongly influenced by national political 
instability, regional conflict associated with the Afghan 
war, and migration and ethnic violence accompanying 
the partitioning of India (Gayer 2014). As a major 
port city, Karachi has also become a strategic hub 
for the Afghan heroin trade, asylum for migrants 
and refugees, and entry point for arms and munition 
destined for Afghanistan (ibid). Rising urban poverty and 
unemployment (particularly among youth), ethno-political 
tensions, socio-spatial divisions, and governance 
failures have combined with these external factors to 
create the conditions conducive to various forms of 
violent conflict – ethno-political, sectarian, militant and 
criminal – throughout the city (Hasan and Mohib 1998; 
Hasan et al. 2015; Gazdar and Mallah 2013; Kaker 
2014; Yusuf 2012).
This working paper examines the impacts of violent 
conflict on the control and contestation of public 
space in Karachi. It focuses specifically on the efforts 
of public and private actors to enhance safety and 
security through the use of physical barriers as a form 
of conflict infrastructure serving to divide contested 
spaces and populations (as documented by Pullan 2013 
in other contested cities). To help provide a way forward, 
recommendations are presented to plan and manage 
physical barriers in ways that are more effective and 
equitable and to support alternative means of security, 
especially for the poor.
1.1 Methods
Case studies were undertaken to profile public 
and private attempts to control and contest public 
space in different parts of the city. Cases include 
neighbourhoods of different socio-economic 
compositions and locations; residences of prominent 
political figures; public and private institutions 
(governmental, educational and religious); military 
installations; public spaces (including major 
thoroughfares, secondary streets, pedestrian footpaths 
and open spaces); and secluded peri-urban areas.
The case studies deployed field surveys and 
photographic documentation, silent probe and 
observation (particularly in more insecure peri-urban 
spaces) and interviews with key informants (including 
security professionals, transport planners and other 
municipal officials), augmented by a literature review. 
A series of stakeholder workshops (Annex I) was also 
held during the research to illicit local insights and to 
galvanise interest in the findings and their relevance to 
urban policy and practice.
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1.2 Structure of the report
This working paper contains four sections. Following 
the Introduction, Section 2 outlines the major historical 
factors that have contributed to persisting socio-spatial 
patterns of violence in Karachi and identifies the various 
spatial manifestations of violent conflict that have 
emerged. Section 3 presents case studies of different 
attempts by public and private actors to control and 
contest public space, with a focus on physical barriers 
and their spatial manifestations and effects. Section 
4 concludes by presenting a set of recommendations 
aimed at planning and managing physical barriers more 
effectively and equitably, and by exploring alternative 
means of security at the community level. Particular 
attention is paid to the subversive nature of the city’s 
ethnic and religious/sectarian politics and the limited 
capacity of the authorities, and their difficulties in 
maintaining neutrality when attempting to intervene.
Public and Private control and contestation of Public sPace amid violent conflict in Karachi
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2 
Socio-spatial patterns 
of violence in Karachi
Karachi was once renowned as the ‘city of lights’ due 
to its vibrant urban life and cosmopolitan character 
(Waqas 2013). However, as it fell into a spiral of 
violence amid mounting ethno-political tensions and 
demographic pressures in the 1980s, Karachi became 
known as the ‘South Asian Beirut’. Today, Karachi’s 
global image has grown more sinister, having earned the 
title of the ‘world’s most dangerous city’ (Khan 2013), 
with a murder rate of 12.3 per 100,000 people in 2011 
(Anwar et al. 2013). As Gayer (2014) points out, this 
title is not entirely fair, given that many smaller cities, 
such as Caracas and Guatemala City, have murder 
rates exceeding 100 per 100,000 people. Nonetheless, 
the city’s reputation for violence is deserved. Between 
2008 and 2012, more than 7,000 people in Karachi 
were killed by various types of violence – ethno-political, 
sectarian, militant and criminal (for a comprehensive 
review, see Yusuf 2012).
Unlike many other conflict-affected cities, where 
rapid social change has prevented sustained political 
dominance, Karachi’s major actors and sites of 
confrontation have remained relatively constant (Gayer 
2014, p. 5). This has been accompanied by the 
concentration of homicidal violence in particular parts 
of the city. Figure 1 illustrates eight violent flashpoints in 
Karachi between 1 January and 31 August 2013. These 
flashpoints include Orangi in the west and Korangi in 
the south-east, which, along with New Karachi in the 
North and Garden/Lines Areas in the city centre, have 
been among the major sites of violence in the city since 
the mid-1990s. As discussed below (Section 2.1.3), 
these patterns generally correspond with the clustering 
of political parties in certain locations, which tend to be 
geographically dispersed and semi-peripheral, forming 
what has been described as a ‘ring of fire’ around the 
city (ibid, p. 7).
This section examines some of the major historical 
factors that have contributed to persisting socio-spatial 
patterns of violence across Karachi. These factors 
include the city’s geographic location; urban migration 
and ethnic partitioning; and planning failure and 
informality. The section goes on to identify the different 
spatial manifestations of violence that have emerged.
2.1 Historical factors
2.1.1 Geographic location
Karachi’s natural port, located at the nexus of Central 
Asia, India, the Persian Gulf and East Africa, has been 
a double-edged sword (Esser 2004; Gayer 2014). 
While the city’s location has connected it to global trade 
and financial networks, it has also turned the city into 
a vestibule for Afghan conflicts; a hub for the Afghan 
heroin trade; an asylum for migrants and refugees (many 
with prior experience as victims and/or perpetrators 
of violent conflict); and an entry point for arms and 
ammunition destined for Afghanistan (Gayer 2014). With 
the sudden inflow of arms into Karachi in the 1980s, 
political conflicts turned increasingly violent, as political 
groups began to militarise (ibid).
Karachi’s dense and porous environment and secluded 
peri-urban spaces have also made the city an ideal 
place for militant groups and terrorists organisations 
(including the Taliban) to permeate and hide. Meanwhile, 
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the collapse of state institutions as a result of rising 
demographic and budgetary pressures, political 
conflicts, ethno-religious tensions and the changing 
nature of urban warfare, has presented additional 
opportunities for organised crime to thrive on illegal 
trade (Esser 2004). In this context, Karachi provides 
an example of how urban spaces in conflict zones can 
create, host, and reinforce social systems and structures 
that perpetuate violent behaviour, particularly in the 
absence of effective state intervention (ibid).
2.1.2 Urban migration and ethnic 
partitioning
Successive waves of migration dating back to the 
eighteenth century have profoundly shaped the 
demographic and cultural landscape of Karachi. 
Whilst a detailed examination of migration trends is 
beyond the scope of this working paper, and is well 
documented elsewhere (see Gayer 2014, p. 23-30; 
Gazdar 2011), the sudden influx of Urdu-speaking 
migrants (mohajirs) into Karachi following the Partition 
of India in 1947 is particularly relevant to consider. As 
the number of mohajirs grew, they came to dominate 
the city’s post-colonial politics with the rising tide of 
Muhajir nationalism (Ring 2006, p. 8). In the 1960s, 
the dominance of the mohajirs was challenged by an 
influx of Pashtun migrants from north-west Pakistan. 
At the same time, increasing numbers of migrants and 
refugees from Pakistan and surrounding countries 
began to arrive in Karachi, further contributing to 
the city’s ethnic diversity. While the city’s precise 
demographic profile remains unclear in the absence 
of reliable census data, estimates indicate that the 
growth in the Pashtun (Pashto-speaking) population has 
gradually cut into the mohajir (Urdu-speaking) majority 
(Figure 2).
These demographic shifts have been accompanied by 
mounting tensions between ethnic groups competing to 
fill the political, cultural and economic vacuum created 
by the departure of the non-Muslim elites who played 
a lead role in the city up until partition (Gayer 2014, p. 
25; Gazdar 2011; Ring 2006). In effect, partition set 
the stage for persisting conflict between competing 
nationalisms (Ahmed 1988; Ring 2006, p. 9), leading 
to the first city-wide ethnic riot in 1985, which claimed 
more than one hundred lives (Yusuf 2012). This event 
paved the way for the Muttahida Qaumi Movement 
Figure 1. Eight flashpoints in Karachi, January 1 – August 31, 2013
Source: Dawn News (2013a)
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(MQM), a political party established in 1984 to 
represent the mohajirs, which added a political aspect 
to the city’s escalating violence (ibid).
In this context, ethnic diversity resulting from migration 
did not contribute to a sense of cosmopolitanism in 
Karachi. Rather, it resulted in the partitioning of urban 
space as the city’s diverse populations re-organised 
into ethnic clusters, with mohajirs organising around 
language, sect, region and city of origin, and with 
Pashtuns organising around village- and clan-based 
networks (Gayer 2014, p. 28). In the decades to come, 
ethnic clustering would intensify following repeated 
episodes of ‘ethnic’ violence, resulting in new forms 
of ‘enclavisation’ along ethnic as well as class lines 
(Kaker 2014).
2.1.3 Planning failure and informality
Whilst most research on violence in Karachi has 
focused on ethnic identity, Fazila-Yacoobali (1996) 
warns that such a focus risks locating the problem away 
from the state. In this vein, Gazdar and Mallah (2013) 
emphasise informality as a useful lens for analysing 
the relationship between political violence and two 
conspicuous state failures regarding security and 
urban planning. 
Karachi’s planning failures can be traced back to its 
colonial legacy and the subsequent lack of an integrated 
planning system to guide rapid population growth – 
driven largely by the refugee crisis – in the post-partition 
era (Gayer 2014, p. 33; Yusuf 2012). As an emerging 
housing crisis intensified, land and housing delivery 
systems began to informalise (Hasan et al. 2015) 
providing officials and unofficial entrepreneurs with 
lucrative opportunities for brokerage and protection, 
which became increasingly violent as access to arms 
increased (Gayer 2014, p. 33). Estimates suggest that 
more than half of Karachi’s population in 1998 lived in 
census units comprised mainly of informal/unplanned 
settlements (Figure 3) (Gazdar and Mallah 2013). Over 
time, these settlements have become increasingly, 
though not exclusively, concentrated in peripheral areas.
Gazdar and Mallah (2013) examine how planning has 
been implicated in the city’s shifting ethnic demography. 
Their analysis of census data showed that most muhajir 
communities live in formal/planned settlements1, while 
most post-partition and pre-partition communities live 
Figure 2. Mother tongue of Karachi residents
Source: Gazdar (2011, p. 8)
1 This can partially be explained by post-1947 urban planning policy, which sought to provide post-partition migrants with housing (Gazdar and Mallah 2013, 
p.3111).
54
49 44 40
15
16
17
18
6
7
8
9
4
4
4
9 11 14 16
11 12 13 14
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
 1981 1998 2011 2025
Urdu Punjabi/Saraiki Sindhi
Balochi Pashto Others
5
IIED WorkIng papEr
   www.iied.org     11
in informal/unplanned settlements (katchi abadis)2. 
Analysis of polling station data also revealed a similar 
connection between election results and ethnic 
divisions in neighbourhoods dominated by particular 
political parties, with most formal settlements being 
strongholds for MQM support and most informal 
settlements being strongholds for rival parties, notably 
the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). The MQM has 
exploited these connections by targeting unplanned 
settlements with eviction (as opposed to regularisation) 
due to the political threat posed by a growing non-
muhajir population. In response, organisations initially 
formed by non-muhajir communities to support 
labourers were adapted to resist eviction. Over time, 
some of these organisations became involved in 
smuggling and heroin trafficking, while others have been 
used by the PPP to secure polling stations and engage 
in armed combat with the MQM (ibid).
Gazdar and Mallah (2013) conclude that violent 
political conflict in many neighbourhoods “can be 
traced to ethno-political divisions between planned and 
unplanned areas and to mutual threat perceptions of 
ethnic groups” (p. 3111). This helps to further explain 
why repeated episodes of violence have reinforced 
Karachiites’ pre-existing preferences for ethnic 
partitioning (Gayer 2014, p. 257). In line with earlier 
predictions by Ahmad (1993), it is likely that this trend 
will continue as Karachi’s diverse populations continue 
to partition themselves into ‘high-risk’ areas and 
‘safe rings’.
2.2 Spatial manifestations
A number of distinct spatial manifestations of violence 
have materialised out of this historical context in Karachi. 
While this study is cross-sectional, it is important to 
note that these spaces, the types of violence occurring 
in them, and the people affected, may change with 
time (of day, month, year), seasons, religious calendars, 
electoral cycles, by social identities and statuses, 
and according to many other variables. Indeed, the 
relationship between urban space and violence is 
Figure 3. Percentage of Karachi’s population in informal settlements
Source: Gazdar and Mallah (2013, p. 3106)
2 This can be partially explained by the fact that Pashtun as well as other migrant groups did not receive any housing support from the state, thus forcing them to 
rely on kinship and village networks (Gayer 2014, p. 256).
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neither linear nor uni-directional. It is nevertheless 
possible to identify a number of spatial manifestations 
of violent conflict that have emerged in Karachi’s 
contemporary landscape. These include the following:
•	 Peri-urban areas – As noted above, violence has 
formed a ‘ring of fire’ around the city, with six out of 
the seven major centres of violence being located 
within a 7-20 kilometre (km) radius of the city core 
(Gayer 2014, p. 7). In 2011, these centres accounted 
for 47 per cent of reported homicides across the city, 
while accounting for only 3.5 per cent of Karachi’s 
total land area and 8.4 per cent of its total population 
(The Herald 2011). However, the city centre has not 
been immune to violent outbreaks, with the Lines 
Area being a major site of intra-mohajir violence 
during the 1990s, and with Kharadar and Lyari and 
their adjoining areas experiencing most of the conflict 
between MQM and the People’s Aman Committee 
(PAC), a politico-militant organisation established in 
2008 by a notorious Lyari bandit (Gayer 2014).
•	 Low-income neighbourhoods – As a major trading 
centre for Afghan heroin, Karachi has attracted 
growing numbers of crime syndicates (Gayer 2014, 
p. 44). As the heroin trade has grown, low-income 
neighbourhoods have become centres of mafia 
operation, exposing residents to various forms of 
criminal violence (Hasan 1986). Entrenched militias 
(including the Taliban) have also transformed many 
low-income neighbourhoods into battlefields, 
exposing residents to raids by state enforcement 
agencies and rival paramilitary organisations, 
reinforcing a perpetual state of chronic violence 
(Gayer 2014, p. 252). Meanwhile, rising tensions 
between ethnic groups in many mixed low-income 
neighbourhoods and katchi abadis have resulted in 
increasing levels of violence, from Orangi to Lyari (ibid, 
p. 257). However, it is important to note that there is 
no inherent link between low-income neighbourhoods 
and insecurity. In large part, insecurity is underpinned 
by the absence of credible state security and 
subsequent reliance on nefarious non-state security 
sub-structures. But this is not always the case. 
In Mumbai, for example, Gupte (2012) finds that 
non-state sub-structures play important roles in 
supplanting credible and accessible state security in 
some low-income neighbourhoods.
•	 Polling stations – During municipal and general 
elections, designated polling stations in Karachi have 
become sites of violence and intimidation as political 
parties have sought to monopolise their territorial 
control of neighbourhoods (Gazdar and Mallah 
2013) and other strategic voting locations (eg public 
schools, university campuses, among other public 
institutions). In some cases, violent clashes between 
armed groups have erupted for control over these 
stations during elections (Yusuf 2012). Some stations 
have also become targets for bomb attacks, as 
demonstrated on Election Day in May 2013 when 13 
people were killed and over 100 people injured in two 
blasts in Quaibabad and Qasba (Dawn News 2013b). 
Attacks against polling stations reflect the periodic 
nature of much of the city’s violent conflict around 
specific events.
•	 Apartment buildings – High-rise apartment blocks 
are increasingly being constructed as developers 
continue to capitalise on growing land values, and as 
municipal authorities seek to achieve density targets 
while adhering to building bylaws (Hasan et al. 2010). 
While much – though not all – of the city’s population 
live in ethnically and religiously homogenous 
neighbourhoods, many apartment buildings display 
significant ethnic mixing (Ring 2006). However, some 
apartments have been taken over by political parties in 
an attempt to evict residents affiliated with rival ethnic 
groups, as demonstrated by the armed battle erupting 
between the MQM, the Awani National Party (ANP) 
(the National Popular Party) and the Jiye Sindh Quami 
Mahaz (JSQM) (the National Front for the Protection 
of Sindh) in the Rabia City apartment complex of 
Gulistan-e-Jauhar in 2011 (Gayer 2014, p. 257-58). 
Some apartments are also run by gangs known to 
extort and harass local residents.
•	 Land – Violent evictions of katchi abadis orchestrated 
by private developers and land mafias often with the 
backing of government bureaucrats have become 
commonplace in Karachi, as population pressures and 
land values have continued to soar. In many instances, 
ruling political parties, such as the MQM (as 
discussed in Section 2.1.3), have used evictions as 
well as large-scale infrastructure projects (eg the Lyari 
expressway) to displace rival ethnic groups (Gayer 
2014; Sadiq-Polack and Ahmed 2010). Gang wars 
are also frequently fought over land acquisition and 
development, as in Lyari (Hasan et al. 2015, p. 142).
•	 Businesses and marketplaces – Places of business 
and markets have become targets for bomb blasts and 
arson. For example, following a bomb blast during a 
Shia religious procession along Mohammed Ali (M.A.) 
Jinnah Road on 28 December 2009, local shops 
owned by Sunni Muslims in Bolton Market – Karachi’s 
largest market located in the Central Business District 
(CBD) – were reported by some to have been set 
ablaze by arsons affiliated with a land mafia interested 
in redeveloping the area into more profitable uses 
(Inskeep 2011). While the specific motive and actors 
responsible for the fire remain a matter of speculation, 
the event further underscores the significance of real 
estate as an emerging source of violent conflict in 
Karachi.
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•	 Streets and public spaces – Target killings 
(particularly involving the use of motorbikes) and 
bomb blasts occur nearly on a daily basis in streets 
and public spaces where intended victims and 
innocent bystanders are exposed and vulnerable to 
attack. This applies especially to crowds in contained 
environments, including security checkpoints, 
transport systems and airports (Elias 2009), as 
demonstrated by the terrorist attack on Karachi’s 
international airport on 8 June 2014, which claimed 
28 lives (Dawn News 2014). More recently, at least 45 
people were killed and 13 injured when six gunmen 
on motorbikes stormed a bus carrying Ismaili Shia 
Muslims on 13 May 2015 (BBC 2015). Disruptive 
protests led by marginalised communities and the 
general public (particularly in response to power 
outages) have also turned streets and public spaces 
into violent arenas.
•	 Places of worship – Churches, mosques, temples, 
among various other religious institutions, have been 
attacked, looted, fired upon and set ablaze, reflecting 
rising religious intolerance across the city (Ali, R 
2012). Such institutions have also been targeted 
by violent protesters demonstrating against power 
outages (ibid).
•	 Educational institutions – University campuses have 
been regular sites of clashes between armed political 
student groups, reflecting rising ethno-political and 
sectarian violence in Karachi (Global Coalition to 
Protect Eduction from Attack 2014). Primary and 
secondary schools for ethnic minorities have also 
been targeted by gunmen and bomb blasts (Agence 
France-Presse 2013).
•	 Gendered spaces – Urban spaces are increasingly 
becoming sites of gender-based violence in Karachi 
(Anwar et al. 2013), reflecting broader trends in 
cities of the global South (UN-Habitat 2013, p. 32; 
Whitzman et al. 2014). Such spaces include those 
listed above, but also those listed below. Further 
research is required to better understand how men 
and women experience violence in different ways 
within and across these and other spaces.
 – Public spaces and the workplace – Women in 
Karachi (particularly among the working class) 
are frequently subjected to violence in public 
spaces (including public transport systems) and 
to harassment and intimidation in the workplace 
(particularly in factories) (Ali, KA 2012; Anwar et al. 
2013). This can be attributed in part to the rising 
involvement of women in paid work outside the 
home (ibid) – another common trend in cities of 
the global South (Chant 2013). Other people with 
subordinate identities are also not immune to violent 
attacks. For example, in `gay cruising’ areas of 
Karachi (as well as Islamabad and Lahore), gay men 
and transgendered persons are frequently picked 
up by groups of people and then gang beaten and/
or raped (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board 
of Canada 2015).
 – The home – Entrenched patriarchal norms and 
emerging notions of ‘hypermasculinity’ in Karachi 
have rewarded the violence of young men, while 
reinforcing hegemonic gender structures (Khan 
2007). As violence perpetrated by young men has 
become increasingly normalised in everyday life, 
women (particularly in low-income neighbourhoods) 
have been continually exposed to various types of 
violence – structural, systemic, physical and direct – 
extending increasingly into the home (Ali, KA 2012; 
Chaudhry 2004). 
The spatial manifestations of violence identified above 
impinge on nearly all spheres of public and private life in 
Karachi, including the community (low- and high-rise), 
workplace, street, place of worship, daily commute, 
marketplace, and the home. Despite their reach, these 
spaces tend to be unevenly distributed both socially 
and geographically, indicating that some groups in 
particular parts of the city are affected by violence 
more than others, depending on their income, planning 
status (ie formal versus informal), ethnicity, religion, 
gender, sexuality, among other intersecting social 
identities and statuses. Moreover, while poor people 
and ‘slum’ dwellers are often blamed by Karachiites 
(fairly or unfairly) as the primary perpetrators of violence, 
they also appear to be disproportionately affected as 
victims (Ebrahim 2011). This is similar to other large 
cities, where violent conflict has become normalised 
into the everyday life of informal settlements, particularly 
in peripheral areas (Briceño-León and Zubillaga 
2002; Pecaut 1999; Scheper-Hughes 1995; UN-
Habitat 2007).
In the absence of effective state intervention, public 
and private actors have taken it upon themselves to 
guard many of the spaces identified above against 
violent conflict. The following section outlines the 
various physical barriers and measures that have been 
deployed in public spaces and examines their spatial 
manifestations and effects.
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3 
Spatial security 
measures
This section outlines the different spatial security 
measures that have emerged in Karachi, presents case 
studies to illustrate their spatial manifestations, and 
concludes by assessing the effects of these measures 
on different spaces and groups of people. Particular 
attention is paid to the extent to which physical barriers 
as a form of conflict infrastructure may be reinforcing 
existing socio-spatial divisions, ethnic tensions and 
insecurities, as observed in other contested cities, 
such as Jerusalem, Berlin, Nicosia, Vukovar, among 
others (Pullan 2013; see also Conflict Cities and the 
Contested State 2012).
3.1 Physical barriers
Cities around the world are increasingly constructing 
conflict infrastructures (eg fences, gates, bollards, 
walls, sand bags, concrete blocks, cargo containers 
etc) as responses to conflict (intra-city, regional and 
international), violence, inter-ethnic fear, contest over 
territory, and as attempts to control immigration (Pullan 
2013). Karachi is no exception. Some of the most 
common barriers (permanent and temporary) identified 
from the case studies (presented in Section 3.4) are 
summarised below.
3.1.1 Permanent barriers
•	 Street barriers, such as iron gates and lever arms 
(often, but not always manned by armed and unarmed 
private security guards).
•	 Reinforced concrete barriers of various shapes and 
sizes.
•	 Spikes made up of metal bars joined together to form 
barricades.
•	 Bollards made up of short metal poles fixed a short 
distance apart to form barricades.
•	 Boundary walls and metal mesh fences topped with 
barbed wire.
•	 Sand bags (or gunny bags) made of wire mesh, lined 
with thick fabric material.
3.1.2 Temporary barriers
•	 Cargo containers installed by police to cordon off 
streets and other public spaces. Such containers are 
often painted dark blue with ‘POLICE’ emblazoned 
on their sides. Others bear the names of the shipping 
companies that own them.
•	 Trucks, buses and trailers parked in rows to block 
streets during protests and processions.
•	 Sand bags temporarily placed to lower the impact of 
explosions. Overtime, they have become permanent 
features in the city.
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•	 Felled electricity poles and other ad hoc debris used 
to barricade streets and other entrances in lower-
income neighbourhoods and katchi abadis.
3.2 Symbolic mechanisms
Symbolic mechanisms used to demarcate authority, 
claim territorial control and warn rival groups are 
frequently deployed by contesting stakeholders 
(particularly gangs) throughout Karachi. These include 
party flags, banners, loud speakers, wall posters and 
especially wall chalking. Rival political parties and gangs 
either observe these mechanisms in silence or retaliate 
with violence.
However, not all symbolic mechanisms are nefarious. A 
new art project called `Reimaging the walls of Karachi’ 
led by `I am Karachi’ is seeking to reclaim walls covered 
with chalking by painting them with new images 
aimed at restoring a sense of pride and optimism in 
the city (see Murad 2015). This project demonstrates 
the positive ways in which public spaces can be 
transformed for the benefit of Karachi, while presenting 
new opportunities for citizens and communities to 
reclaim ownership of their city.
3.3 Surveillance systems
Surveillance systems are often used to detect weapons 
(eg metal detectors) and intrusions (eg alarm systems), 
monitor and record intruders (eg video recording 
systems), and trigger incident responses (eg by security 
guards and the police) (Talbot and Jakeman 2009). 
Among the most popular deterrence measures used by 
the authorities in Karachi are closed-circuit television 
(CCTV) systems, which cover all major streets and 
public spaces and are connected to the central control 
room at police headquarters. According to police 
officials, rapid response is initiated after observing 
any unusual occurrences. However, as indicated by a 
senior journalist, CCTV systems are often damaged 
or destroyed by criminal elements in particular 
neighbourhoods, as in Lyari. In such neighbourhoods, 
informal surveillance mechanisms are often deployed 
by gangs and other armed groups for the purposes of 
identifying and monitoring outsiders, the police, and 
other potential threats.
The spatial measures outlined above are commonly 
used to enhance the security of both public and private 
spaces – residential, commercial, institutional, etc – 
across the city. Due to rising security threats, the use 
of these measures has extended to educational and 
religious spaces, particularly during culturally significant 
rituals and events, as documented below (see 
Section 3.4.2.3). 
3.4 Spatial manifestations
The physical security systems outlined above have 
resulted in a number of distinct spatial manifestations 
with differential effects for certain groups. These include 
the following.
3.4.1 Forced cul-de-sacs
Forced cul-de-sacs are streets blocked by physical 
barriers, creating dead ends. These streets were initially 
planned to be public thoroughfares, but have been 
either closed from one end or both. In some cases, 
security gates (chowkis) are manned and monitored 
by private unarmed and armed guards (chowkidars) 
employed either by individual households or 
neighbourhood organisations. Chowkidars permit entry 
only after they have conducted vehicle and pedestrian 
checks, although not all chowkis are manned. In 
other cases, iron gates have been installed, including 
some that are permanently closed and others that are 
operated by chowkidars.
3.4.1.1 Common locations
•	 Gated neighbourhoods and apartment blocks.
•	 Streets around religious gathering spaces and other 
culturally and politically significant institutions.
•	 Streets around residences occupied by high profile 
people.
•	 Market places and other busy locations where 
entrances are blocked and controlled.
3.4.1.2 Barriers deployed
•	 Arm lever barriers are common, but their state of 
repair and upkeep vary widely.
•	 Iron grill gates standing up to eight feet tall are 
common. They may be reinforced with additional arm 
lever barriers a few feet behind them.
•	 In more unusual cases, walls have been built around 
residential areas and streets to provide protection 
against criminal and terrorist elements.
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3.4.1.3 Effects on beneficiaries and the 
burdened
•	 Protecting residents against threats (real or perceived) 
from unknown pedestrians and vehicles.
•	 Impeding traffic flow within and through 
neighbourhoods, creating travel inconveniences for 
the broader community.
•	 Blocking streets prevents informal vendors and 
domestic workers from entering neighbourhoods, 
adversely affecting their livelihoods and the mobility of 
women.
•	 Reinforcing trends towards enclavisation along ethnic 
and class lines.
3.4.1.3 Case studies
Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Block 9
Gulshan-e-Iqbal is a middle-to-upper income planned 
neighbourhood in eastern Karachi (Figure 4). Residents 
generally belong to mixed religious, sectarian and ethnic 
backgrounds. Due to security concerns, most streets 
and lanes in the neighbourhood have been installed with 
metal and/or concrete barriers. Some residents have 
pooled their finances to construct solid metal gates 
and to employ chowkidars to stand their guard at the 
end of each street. As a result, only vehicles belonging 
to residents or their guests are permitted to enter. This 
applies similarly to pedestrians.
Figure 4. Gulshan-e-Iqbal Block-9
Source: Authors
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Although streets and lanes are public spaces, many 
have become semi-private, having been closed off to 
non-residents by gates. The municipal administration, 
law enforcement agencies and other government bodies 
seem to have informally accepted the emergence of 
these spaces, even though they often contravene formal 
regulations. These spaces now occupy most middle-to-
upper income neighbourhoods in the city.
Due to its location adjacent to Aziz Bhatti Park and a 
nearby katchi abadis, the neighbourhood is said to be 
strongly affected by petty theft and street crime. As a 
response to countless mobile phone and motorcycle 
snatching incidents, the residents, with the permission 
of the police, have taken it upon themselves to install 
various kinds of barriers, including arm lever barriers, 
grilled gates, and walls (see Figures 5-7).
During the interviews, residents reported an improved 
level of security after installation of metal gates. 
However, these barriers have also impeded the ability 
of local informal vendors from entering the community 
to conduct their business, adversely affecting 
their livelihoods. 
Figure 5. Unmanned iron gate
Photo credit: Authors
Figure 6. Manned pole lever and iron gate
Photo credit: Authors
Figure 7. Barrier wall surrounding residence
Photo credit: Authors
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North Nazimabad, Block C
North Nazimabad is a planned neighbourhood in north 
eastern Karachi. While its residents have different 
social, religious and cultural backgrounds, some 
areas have become focal points for specific religious 
communities. In particular, ‘C’ block is dominated by 
the Dawoodi Bohra community, which is an offshoot 
of Shia Muslims. The Bohras have their Jamaat Khana 
(place of worship) and other communal facilities in this 
area. Until recently, there were no barriers in this part 
of the neighbourhood, as Bohras have lived in peace 
alongside other groups. However, this quickly changed 
when the Bohras were impacted by several terrorist 
attacks, which left many people dead and wounded. 
As feelings of insecurity have spread, all streets leading 
into the Bohra community have been blocked with metal 
and concrete barriers, effectively creating a compound 
(Figure 8). No vehicle or pedestrian can enter without 
being checked by chowkidars at the chowkis (Figure 9). 
National identity cards must also be produced.
Prominent buildings in the Bohra Compound, including 
the Bohra Mosque, Jamea University, a hostel and 
auditorium, have been further protected by closing all 
surrounding streets, including many secondary streets. 
These road closings have created a long detour leading 
into the area from a back route. The barriers have also 
had an impact on the community’s social composition, 
as houses owned by non-Bohra residents are 
increasingly being sold to Bohras.
Figure 8. North Nazimabad, Block C
Source: Authors
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Mehfil-e-Shah-e-Khurasan Numaish
The central religious processions by Shia Muslims 
in Karachi begin from Mehfil-e-Shah-e-Khurasan, an 
historic mosque located a short walk east of M.A. 
Jinnah Road (Figure 10). As a religious landmark, the 
mosque attracts thousands of worshippers, especially 
during the Muharram/Ashura days. After congregating 
and performing the necessary rituals, the procession 
moves from the mosque to M.A. Jinnah Road before 
proceeding about three kilometres south to Hussainian 
Iranian Imam Bargah in Kharadar.
Khurasan Imam Bargah lies in a residential 
neighbourhood developed in the 1930s. Like other 
places of Shia worship, this site faces serious threats. 
The administration has blocked all lanes and streets 
leading to the site. Metal and concrete barriers have 
been installed, obstructing vehicular movement through 
and around the site. No one can enter into the precinct 
without a body search and identity clearance. During 
Muharam and other important religious holidays, the 
police temporarily place empty cargo containers to 
visually and physically seal the Khurasan Imam Bargah. 
The procession route during rituals is declared a no-
vehicle area to facilitate movement. However, access for 
residents of surrounding neighbourhoods remains an 
acute problem for most of the year as religious activities 
have continued to expand and intensify. 
Figure 9. Barriers blocking entrance into North Nazimabad, Block C
Figure 10. Mehfil-e-Shah-e-Khurasan
Source: Authors
Photo credit: Authors
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Ancholi, Federal ‘B’ Area 
Ancholi, Federal ‘B’ Area has gradually become a 
predominantly Shia Muslim neighbourhood (Figure 11). 
During the last ten years, attacks on Shia and threats 
to their life and property have increased considerably. 
This has motivated many Shia to re-locate to this and 
other neighbourhoods where their numbers are high 
and they are more readily able to control the security of 
their community. 
Ancholi in Federal ‘B’ Area has become a desirable 
location for many middle-income community members 
seeking secure housing. The neighbourhood’s streets, 
entry points, exits and boundaries are strictly guarded 
by private security guards with the help of the police. 
All streets and lanes and the boundaries of Imam 
bargah are fortified with barriers, check point gates and 
chowkis. Measures such as barriers, check points and 
surveillance cameras are also used to deter outsiders. 
Despite these precautions, target attacks by rival 
sectarian groups continue unabated. In addition, while 
the barriers and surveillance provide some sense of 
security in the community, residents remain vulnerable 
to attack when they commute to work or attend other 
social obligations in other parts of the city. 
Empty cargo containers placed at the intersection of 
the main road and secondary streets reflect Ancholi’s 
sensitivity. Cargo containers are often stacked on 
sidewalks and manned by police officers. All streets 
have also been blocked by gates that open only for 
residents after their identity has been verified. Recently, 
residents have collected money from the community 
to increase the presence of private security guards at 
the gates. 
Streets around Imam bargah in Acholi have also been 
permanently closed and are thus no longer used. There 
are arm lever barriers in the inner streets apart from 
the gates that block the main streets. However, some 
residents interviewed indicated that many of these 
barriers have been installed only to deter unwanted 
parking in front of houses.
Figure 11. Ancholi, Federal ‘B’ Area
Source: Authors
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Azizabad ‘90’ – Headquarters of the MQM
Azizibad 90 is the home of the leader of the MQM, 
the second largest political party in Sindh. Although 
he resides abroad, all party activities take place in 
the vicinity. It now acts as the MQM head office. Until 
March 2015, all streets leading to the house were 
blocked by arm lever barriers and monitored by party 
volunteers. Once a main thoroughfare, Mukka Chowk, 
the road leading to Azizabad 90, has been gradually 
blocked by concrete barriers. Initially, only one side of 
the road was surrounded, but until recently no traffic 
was allowed on either side. The entrance is marked by 
a police vehicle, party volunteers (often believed to be 
armed), city wardens, and concrete barriers installed by 
traffic police. Only residents and visitors with security 
clearance are permitted inside. A small cabin serving 
as a help desk is where visitors must register, show 
identification and state the purpose of their visit. After 
passing this checkpoint, visitors are relatively free to 
move about. But if visitors wish to visit the Khurshid-
Memorial hall (The Rabata (Liaison) Committee office), 
they must register a second time and surrender any 
sharp objects. There are other chowkis as one walks 
towards the office. As visitors reach the office, their 
belongings are checked again for any suspicious 
objects. According to an MQM representative, the 
physical barriers have now become mandatory to 
ensure security, especially after the numerous terrorist 
attacks at their office and the target killings of their 
party workers.
The rangers raided Azizibad 90 on 11 March 2015 and 
arrested a few alleged target killers and criminals from 
the area. Many barriers have since been removed from 
the around the MQM head office. 
3.4.2 Disrupted footpaths 
This category includes sidewalks that have been 
disrupted by physical barriers installed to protect 
offices, military installations and public buildings 
from attacks by militant groups, extremist sectarian 
organisations, among other potential threats. The 
disruptions the barriers have caused have made it 
impossible for pedestrians to use these footpaths.
3.4.2.1 Common locations
•	 Boundary walls of military bases
•	 Police and rangers’ posts and stations
•	 Public buildings
•	 Hotels
•	 Schools, offices and banks
•	 Embassies and consulates, and
•	 Prisons.
3.4.2.2 Barriers deployed
•	 Concrete barriers and blocks are installed to prevent 
entry of vehicles and pedestrians. These barriers are 
often painted in black and white or in red and yellow 
stripes to increase their visibility. In other cases, they 
are disguised as planters to blend into the building 
facade and streetscape. Many concrete blocks bear 
the embossed initials of the Municipal Department, 
‘KMC’.
•	 In special cases, sand barriers are installed as high 
as boundary walls to provide additional reinforcement 
against explosions.
•	 Metal spikes are installed to deter attackers. Like the 
concrete barriers, these spikes are often painted red 
and yellow or black and white. 
•	 Cargo containers painted dark blue and featuring the 
police logo in white are temporarily installed to block 
roads. In other cases, they bear the names of the 
companies that own them. 
•	 High reinforced concrete walls topped with barbed 
wire are constructed around sensitive locations.
•	 Bollards are placed a few feet apart to allow 
pedestrian movement, while serving as a barrier for 
vehicles.
•	 Sand bags are made of wire mesh lined with thick 
fabric material and are filled with sand. These bags are 
temporarily placed to lower the impact of explosions, 
but have become permanent fixtures on many streets.
3.4.2.3 Effects on beneficiaries and the 
burdened
•	 Protecting residences and institutions against 
potential intrusions.
•	 Encroaching and blocking public footpaths, reducing 
walkability and creating additional hazards for 
pedestrians by forcing them into traffic.
•	 Blocking entrances to residences and institutions, 
inhibiting pedestrian access.
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3.4.2.4 Case studies
Consulates and embassies
Consulates and embassies, mainly located in the Clifton 
and Defense localities, are protected by concrete 
blocks in various shapes and sizes, ranging from about 
2 to 9 feet high, with planters or chains linking them 
together. Chowkis are often built on the corners with 
fixed surveillance systems to monitor pedestrian as well 
as vehicular movement in the nearby vicinity. Consulates 
hire private security guards to protect their premises. 
They often block smaller roads and service lanes 
adjacent to boundary walls for further protection, but 
often at the expense of pedestrian access.
Educational institutions
Educational institutions have increasingly undertaken 
security measures, particularly following anonymous 
threats. Schools attended by children of high profile 
individuals tend to be more heavily fortified with physical 
barriers than others. The same concrete barriers used 
elsewhere also line the boundary walls of schools and 
block gates. After the deadly attack on the Army Public 
School in Peshawar, that claimed the lives of up to 141 
children on 16 December 2014 (Sherazi et al. 2014), 
schools throughout the country have installed barriers to 
enhance their security. 
For example, Karachi Grammar School (KGS) is a 
primary, secondary and higher-secondary institution 
located in Clifton, an affluent suburb in the Saddar Town 
of Karachi (Figure 12). Affiliated with the University 
of Cambridge in the United Kingdom (UK), KGS is 
attended by children from upper-income and influential 
households (including those headed by high ranking 
civil servants and police officers), making it a target for 
terrorist and political groups. Around a decade ago, 
KGS management installed barriers and fortifications 
around the premise in response to terror threats 
(Figures 12-14). The access road and portion of the 
Figure 12. Karachi Grammar School – View of fortifications
Source: Authors
Figure 13. Concrete blocks lining perimeter of KGS
Figure 14. Poll lever blocking entry to KGS
Photo credit: Authors
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main front street were impacted as a result. Barbed 
wire, partial closure of the back streets and alteration in 
the adjoining part are some other visible obstructions. 
During the early morning and afternoons, the streets 
are heavily congested with private cars coming to pick 
and drop off children. With barriers and limited access 
points, the streets become virtually non-navigable for 
ordinary citizens, especially those who reside in the 
adjoining areas. As terror threats to high profile schools 
are still valid, the security agencies have not dismantled 
any barriers or barbed wires from around the premises 
of KGS.
UK Deputy High Commission
The UK Deputy High Commission is located in the Old 
Clifton area where many other diplomatic commissions 
are concentrated (Figure 15). Security measures were 
normal until 9/11 motivated most commissions to make 
improvements. All vital arteries and footpaths leading to 
the UK High Commission are now blocked by barriers 
and its entire perimeter is surrounded by sand bags. 
Since much of the surrounding area is a low density elite 
neighbourhood, people are able to adjust and manage 
the impacts of security barriers. But when the traffic 
moving through Shahra-e-Iran to the beach increases, 
it causes problems for pedestrian movement and 
accessibility. 
Figure 15. UK Deputy High Commission – View of fortifications
Source: Authors 
Public and Private control and contestation of Public sPace amid violent conflict in Karachi
24     www.iied.org
Hotels
Following an attack on the Karachi Sheraton Hotel 
in 2002 (McCarthy and Webster 2002), hotels have 
enhanced their security significantly. The presence 
of foreigners and tourists (especially people from 
Western countries) combined with high levels of mobility 
heighten the vulnerability of hotels to terror attacks. 
Concrete blocks reinforced by sand bags are the 
most common security barriers for hotels (Figure 16). 
In other instances, cargo containers have been cut in 
half and stacked on top of each other to form walls at 
hotel entrances. There has been encroachment over 
side roads to further protect these establishments. One 
hotel has also constructed their parking space in the 
premises of a high profile public park adjacent to it. In 
other instances, small businesses have taken over public 
sidewalks to increase both parking and security.
3.4.3 Restricted thoroughfares
Events such as rallies and processions require space 
for people to gather. In Karachi, these spaces are 
almost always the main thoroughfares, which are the 
responsibility of the police to protect from attacks. 
Different methods are used to cordon off routes, control 
and monitor entry points and to divert pedestrians 
and vehicles.
3.4.3.1 Common locations
•	 Entry points to major streets and thoroughfares.
3.4.3.2 Barriers deployed
•	 Cargo containers (often featuring ‘POLICE’ or the 
names of the companies that own them on the side)
•	 Buses temporarily parked perpendicular to roads
•	 Concrete blocks.
3.4.3.3 Effects on beneficiaries and the 
burdened
•	 Permitting control of pedestrian and vehicular access
•	 Impeding pedestrian and vehicular accessibility to limit 
participation in processions and protests
•	 Forcing people to climb over them, creating additional 
hazards.
3.4.3.4 Case studies
Notable thoroughfares and locations where rallies 
and processions commonly occur include Numaish- 
Khurasan, Nishter Park, M.A, Jinnah Road and Karachi 
Press Club. Barriers commonly deployed are illustrated 
in Figures 17-19.
Figure 16. Barriers surrounding the Marriot Hotel (Dr Ziauddin Ahmed Road & Abdullah Haroon Road)
Photo credit: Authors
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3.4.4 Privately controlled public spaces
The private control of public space around prominent 
residences and offices of political party leaders, and 
provincial, federal, and military administrators has 
become increasingly common. More than ever, politically 
influential connections are pressuring the government 
to permit the construction of fortifications. Permission is 
usually granted informally. 
3.4.4.1 Common locations
•	 Residences of political leaders
•	 Public offices
•	 Gated communities.
3.4.4.2 Barriers deployed
•	 High walls constructed around sensitive residences. 
Their tops are often reinforced with metal spikes or 
barbed wire.
•	 Metal grills installed around the perimeters of 
residents and on traffic islands to prevent pedestrians 
from crossing the road.
•	 Cargo containers installed to block roads and 
footpaths, many of which have become permanent 
fixtures.
•	 Concrete blocks barricade roads and footpaths.
Figure 17. Police positioning temporary cargo container
Figure 18. Cargo containers blocking pedestrian and 
vehicular access
Photo credit: Authors
Figure 19. People jumping over cargo containers 
Photo credit: Authors
Photo credit: Authors
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3.4.4.3 Effects on beneficiaries and the 
burdened
•	 Protecting individuals and communities they were 
designed for by controlling and monitoring pedestrian 
and vehicle traffic.
•	 Removing space from the public realm, effectively 
privatising it often for commercial gain.
•	 Impinging on pedestrian and vehicular accessibility 
and movement.
3.4.4.4 Case studies
Bilawal House
Bilawal House is a residential bungalow in Clifton 
occupied by Mr Bilawal Bhutto and Mr Asif Ali Zardari, 
the Chairman and Co-Chairman of the PPP, respectively 
(Figure 20). Although the residence has been routinely 
monitored and guarded for the last five years, physical 
security interventions have increased considerably 
following an attack on the convoy of Ms Bhutto on 
18 October 2007, and her subsequent assassination 
on 27 December the same year. Attacks on the party 
stronghold combined with a growing lack of confidence 
in the ability of the police to protect the property have 
motivated additional security interventions. These have 
included the construction of a concrete wall running 
parallel to the property along Shalrah-e-Iran (a major 
arterial road), the complete closure of Shalrah-e-Iran, 
and the introduction of security check points at either 
end (Figure 21).
These interventions have significantly impacted the 
surrounding area by removing public space through 
the construction of walls and barriers that have also 
impeded accessibility and freedom of movement. Many 
residents complain that such interventions reflect 
growing efforts by political and economic elites to use 
public spaces for their own purposes.
Figure 20. Bilawal House – View of fortifications
Source: Authors 
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3.4.5 Diminishing green strips and 
medians
In conventional neighbourhood design, private 
properties fronting onto public streets are lined with 
green strips and medians to facilitate infrastructures 
below the surface (eg municipal electricity cables) or 
services on the surface (eg refuse collection). These 
spaces are increasingly being taken over by property 
owners for the purposes of enhancing security through 
the construction of boundary walls, iron grills, metal 
mesh fences, among other physical barriers. In effect, 
these barriers are used to privately occupy and illegally 
acquire public space.
3.4.5.1 Common locations
•	 Residential areas 
•	 Between sidewalks and street kerbs
•	 Between private properties and the public right-of-
way.
3.4.5.2 Barriers deployed
•	 Walls 
•	 Iron grills
•	 Mesh metal fences
•	 Metallic spikes
•	 Boundary walls topped with barbed wire.
3.4.5.3 Effects on beneficiaries and the 
burdened
•	 Increasing safety by taking over the control and 
management of public space
•	 Interrupting the operation and maintenance of 
municipal infrastructure and services.
Examples of diminishing green strips and medians 
can be seen throughout the city’s residential areas, 
from Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Gulistan-e-Jauhar to North 
Nazimabad.
3.4.6 Security structures in public 
spaces
There is an expanding typology of structures erected 
in public spaces for security purposes. These 
include police check posts on footpaths, rooms and 
accommodation for security guards, and various 
guard and watch towers. While many check posts and 
watchtowers remain vacant, they stand as symbols of 
vigilance over elements of civil unrest. 
3.4.6.1 Common locations
•	 Areas prone to attacks, including footpaths, end of 
residential streets, central locations, and residences 
of prominent political and religious figures.
Figure 21. Barrier blocking entry to public road leading to Bilawal House
Photo credit: Authors
Public and Private control and contestation of Public sPace amid violent conflict in Karachi
28     www.iied.org
3.4.6.2 Barriers deployed
•	 Check posts (e.g. individual structures for police and 
rangers)
•	 Concrete watch towers (including ground level and up 
to two storeys)
•	 Cargo containers (used as ad hoc posts).
3.4.6.3 Effects on beneficiaries and the 
burdened
•	 Check posts and guard towers enhance vigilance over 
vulnerable public spaces
•	 General public subjected to spot checks and 
searches.
3.4.6.4 Case studies
Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Gulshan Chowrangi, University Road 
and many other streets in the city
Rangers’ posts have recently been built in central areas 
to provide vantage views. Examples of locations where 
these posts are typically found include the central 
median of the main Rashid Minhas Road, on the main 
roundabout of Safoora Chowk, at the corner of the 
military establishments on Dalmia Road, and on the 
U turn centre island on University Road. A container, 
acting as a police post, can be seen in front of the 
Empress Market, with barbed wire encircling it.
3.4.7 Gated communities
Gated communities are generally distinguished from 
others by their inward-looking spaces, bounded form 
and privatised security. In Karachi, gated communities, 
including gated apartment blocks, have become the 
norm for most middle and high-income developments 
(The DAWN National Weekend Advertiser 2012), 
reflecting broader trends in the global South (Landman 
and Schönteich 2002).
3.4.7.1 Common locations
•	 New middle and high-income neighbourhood 
developments (particularly in, but not limited to, 
peripheral areas)
•	 Retrofitted middle- and high-income neighbourhoods
•	 Apartment blocks.
3.4.7.2 Barriers deployed
•	 Walls
•	 Arm levers
•	 Iron gates.
3.4.7.3 Effects on beneficiaries and the 
burdened
•	 Protecting and insulating residents from outside 
threats (real or perceived).
•	 Contributing to the inequitable provision of 
infrastructure in instances where municipalities 
approve and in some instances co-finance barriers 
and other infrastructure improvements for higher-
income, but not lower-income, neighbourhoods.
•	 Contributing to the social divisions that fuel ethno-
political violence.
3.4.7.4 Case studies 
Overseas Housing Society
The Overseas Housing Society is a planned housing 
cooperative built in the 1980s to accommodate people 
who live abroad and spend their holidays in Karachi. 
There are numerous parks, a school and various shops 
among other amenities in the neighbourhood. It is 
similar to other planned residential areas in Karachi, 
with the exception of the relatively inconspicuous walls 
that surround it. Some walls are short and thus less 
noticeable as compared to many other residential areas 
with much higher walls.
According to a member of the administration, spending 
on security retrofits has increased markedly, reaching 
two hundred thousand rupees per month (US$ 2000/= 
approximately). Security measures now include a main 
gate guarded by two security personnel, a reinforced 
barrier and a guard post recently built on top of a wall 
painted in bright colours to increase its visibility. Visitors 
are required to submit their identity card and to indicate 
the address of the residence they wish to visit.
Askari IV
Askari IV is one of Karachi’s many military owned and 
run housing estates built as apartment complexes 
for military officials and their families. As one of the 
best maintained housing schemes in the city, Askari 
IV features a large mosque, a shopping complex, 
basketball courts, and numerous parks. These features 
have attracted growing numbers of civilians over time. 
The estate has high boundary walls and gates manned 
by security guards. Some residents desire a primary 
school to be built in the estate to protect their children 
from the city’s declining security situation. The 
concentration of basic amenities, infrastructure and 
services in gated communities reflects the internalisation 
of the city’s population. 
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3.4.8 Secluded peri-urban spaces
As noted above (Section 2.1), secluded peri-urban areas 
serve as ideal places for criminal elements and terrorist 
groups to permeate and hide. This is especially the case 
in dense, highly porous and poorly policed katchi abadis 
in peripheral settings. Compared to other settlements, 
katchi abadis typically lack permanent physical barriers, 
which are often not supported by municipal authorities. 
Instead, symbolic mechanisms have been used by 
gangs, criminal elements and other armed groups to 
delineate territorial control and demarcate authority and 
political affiliation. 
3.4.8.1 Common locations
•	 Katchi abadis (peripheral as well as inner-city 
locations).
3.4.8.2 Barriers deployed
Direct barriers include:
•	 Flags and banners
•	 Wall chalking
•	 Deliberately placed obstacles (eg felled electricity 
poles).
Indirect barriers include:
•	 Density
•	 Narrow footpaths and streets.
3.4.8.3 Effects on beneficiaries and the 
burdened
•	 Warning outsiders to avoid entering territories 
controlled by rival groups
•	 Generating conflict over territorial control, resulting in 
violent outbursts
•	 Allowing criminals and gang members to evade police
•	 Contributing to the ghettoisation and marginality of 
katchi abadis.
3.4.8.4 Case studies
Lyari
Lyari is home to various opposing gangs embroiled 
in turf wars that affect all residents. Physically, Lyari 
is dense with narrow streets (often allowing only two 
people to walk abreast) and numerous dilapidated 
buildings, which in effect serve as an indirect barrier 
against outsiders. Gang members also use their 
familiarity with settlement layouts to escape the police 
and rangers by skipping from rooftop-to-rooftop or 
slipping from one house to another. In other instances, 
speed-bumps and felled electric poles across streets 
are used to hinder the infiltration of security forces.
Armed gang members in Lyari also serve as guards 
outside houses and in the streets. Gangs commonly 
employ teenagers for around 600-1,000 rupees to track 
and monitor activities and outsiders in the area and to 
conduct informal security checks. Men are interrogated 
more than women, since women in the community 
are mostly known. Recently, five people of the same 
family were killed in Moach Goth because they were 
suspected of providing information on the gangs to 
outsiders or the authorities.
Field observations and conversations with area 
residents suggest that demarcation of territorial control 
is done through flags, banners and wall chalking by 
various party activists and their supporters (Figures 22 
and 23). 
Figure 22. View of flagged street in Lyari
Photo credit: Authors
Figure 23. Wall chalking on a dead end street corner in Lyari
Photo credit: Authors
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Baldia
Baldia is a loosely governed and policed neighbourhood 
with a variety of rival gangs, who demarcate their 
territorial control using flags and wall chalking (Figures 
24 and 25). Such mechanisms work to deter outsiders 
and other trespassers from entering rival gang territory. 
Any dispute or crime occurring in a given territory is the 
responsibility of the controlling gang to manage and 
resolve. An informal mechanism of conflict resolution 
and dispute negotiation has thus evolved without any 
link with formal law enforcement agencies.
Figure 24. Flags flying in Baldia
Photo credit: Authors
Figure 25. Wall chalking in Baldia
Photo credit: Authors
Korangi
Korangi was originally planned by the Ministry of 
Rehabilitation under the military government of Ayub 
Khan in 1960s as a populist low-income housing 
scheme for partition migrants from India. The formation 
of the housing scheme provided housing for the 
workforce of the Korangi Industrial Estate. Although 
the physical elements of the scheme were planned by 
the government, the social and economic structures 
required to support the community were not. 
Korangi is divided into several territories controlled by 
rival gangs, which often clash when crimes or acts of 
terror are committed against one another. Innocent 
residents suffer immensely when incidences of violence 
erupt as a result of on-going differences. Like Lyari and 
Baldia, flags and wall chalking are used by gangs to 
demarcate territorial control (Figure 26).
Figure 26. Wall chalking in Korangi
Photo credit: Authors
Orangi
Orangi Housing Scheme was part of Plot Townships 
planned by the Karachi Development Authority (KDA) in 
1964 intended to resettle refugee squatter settlements 
from the inner city to the periphery. Although intended 
for low-income groups, the scheme was sold to middle-
income groups as a speculative property investment. 
The influx of migrants from East Pakistan in the late 
60s and early 70s led to rising conflicts over the area’s 
development. The scheme was informally extended and 
developed into adjacent vacant areas through a process 
of illegal subdivision, absorbing more than 3,600 acres. 
Political riots and unstable conditions motivated many 
middle-income residents in planned areas to resettle to 
other areas or to sell their properties, leaving Orangi to 
become a largely low-income locality. 
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Orangi remains a troubled neighbourhood. Different 
ethnic and sectarian groups continue to battle over 
territorial control, while law enforcement agencies 
have been unable to effectively respond. Like the 
other settlements above, flags and wall chalking are 
used by armed and political groups to demarcate 
territorial control.
3.5 Effects
As noted by Section 2.2, the relationship between 
urban space and insecurity is changing and shifting 
just as quickly as the city itself. In an attempt to pacify 
this relationship in the absence of effective state 
intervention, physical barriers have emerged as the 
dominate mechanism of control and contestation. 
Following Pullan’s (2013) research on conflict 
infrastructures in contested cities, this section profiles 
the different effects that barriers have had on different 
spaces and groups of people, including the socio-
spatial divisions between them.
Effects on individuals versus the collective – Most 
physical barriers make the communities and institutions 
they were designed for safer and more secure. Among 
the most obvious examples are gated communities, 
which protect their residents from outside security 
threats through fortification and private security. 
Other security initiatives deployed by both public and 
private actors to control public space have enhanced 
their own security by controlling pedestrian and 
vehicular access, but often without sufficient, or any, 
consideration of the indirect effects on the surrounding 
community and broader city (particularly in terms of 
reduced accessibility, mobility and safety). Since most 
barriers are informally constructed by self-interested 
individuals, such considerations are largely overlooked 
at the expense of the general public, who are often 
exposed to additional hazards as a consequence (eg 
disrupted footpaths create additional hazards by forcing 
pedestrians into traffic).
Effects on high- versus low-income groups 
– Many residents associations in higher-income 
neighbourhoods have been able to negotiate with local 
authorities for infrastructure improvements (eg barriers 
and CCTV systems) that have enhanced their security. 
According to Kaker (2014), this has resulted in a “private 
sub-structure of local municipal service provision” (p. 
97) that has increased the security and property values 
of affluent neighbourhoods while allowing the city 
government to gain political support and credibility.
In shifting state-society relations towards the interests 
of higher-income groups, lower-income groups remain 
neglected in terms of municipal service provision 
and policing. Barriers have also adversely affected 
the livelihoods of informal vendors from nearby 
lower-income neighbourhoods and katchi abadis by 
preventing them from selling their goods and services in 
higher-income neighbourhoods. 
Effects on women versus men – Violent conflict does 
not always differentiate between men and women, as 
in the case of terror attacks perpetrated against the 
general public. However, the findings suggest that 
women and men are often affected by both violent 
conflict (as discussed in Section 2.2) and by barriers in 
different ways.
For example, lower-income women, including domestic 
servants, are often forced to detour or commute longer 
distances where physical barriers restrict mobility, 
exposing them to additional insecurities along the way 
(eg harassment, sexual and gender-based violence, 
extortion, etc). Women in both high- and low-income 
neighbourhoods are also commonly excluded from 
decision-making regarding security for traditional and 
cultural reasons. However, much more needs to be 
understood about how men and women are affected by 
various types of violent conflict in particular spaces and 
by barriers in different ways.
Effects on ‘us’ versus ‘them’ – The case studies 
in addition to the broader literature (for example, 
Kaker 2014) suggest that barriers are contributing 
to the underlying social tensions and ethnic divisions 
that are fuelling violent conflict across the city. Of 
particular concern is the increasing prevalence of gated 
neighbourhoods as a reflection of growing intra-urban 
disparities, particularly between secluded peripheral 
areas and the more visible inner city. Similar concerns 
exist in many other conflict-affected cities, where 
conflict infrastructures, “dislocate city spatial structures 
to cause severe spatial discontinuities. In doing so, they 
can damage the plurality of cities and, in extreme cases, 
the very nature of urban experience; ultimately, they may 
disrupt the exigencies of long-term urban order” (Pullan 
2013: 19).
Effects on conflict versus peace – The case studies 
on peri-urban neighbourhoods (Section 3.4.8.4) 
suggest that barriers (direct and indirect) may be 
creating spaces for crime, violence and terrorism to 
thrive. On the other hand, barriers could, in principle, 
create spaces where relative peace can be maintained 
or even built.
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However, the case studies on gated neighbourhoods 
(Section 3.4.7.4) suggest that such spaces tend to be 
concentrated in higher-income neighbourhoods and 
other privately securitised compounds. Much more 
needs to be understood about other factors that may 
be contributing to relative peace in these and other 
spaces, such as the social composition and cohesion 
of communities, the existence of social capital, and 
the potential role of women. The art project seeking 
to reclaim Karachi’s walls from chalking, as outlined 
in Section 3.2 (see also Murad 2015), represents an 
example of public spaces in which peace may be, to 
borrow from Ring (2006), ‘breaking out’. It is, however, 
unlikely that such initiatives would have any effect on 
reducing the level of violent conflict in the short term 
under the current circumstances.
Effects on public versus private space – The informal 
installation of barriers by both public and private actors 
is removing space from the public realm, effectively 
privatising its management and control often for 
commercial gain (eg the conversion of sidewalks into 
parking by small businesses). This raises important 
questions about local democracy and accountability 
regarding the increasing role of private interests in 
policing and controlling public space, and about 
people’s right to use these spaces for a variety of 
activities (political and non-political).
Effects on public versus private control of space – 
The prevalence of barriers throughout the city reflects 
the extent to which security has become a private 
rather than a public concern. In effect, the increasing 
involvement of citizens in guaranteeing their own 
security has helped the state to abdicate itself from its 
responsibility to uphold safety and security in the public 
realm. But while the privatisation of security may make 
sense in a highly divided city, it covers up the corruption 
and connivance of the state’s own security apparatus in 
creating and reinforcing insecurity. It also reinforces a 
culture that demotivates and discourages citizens from 
engaging with the state to improve security or address 
the root causes of poor law and order as well as violent 
conflict itself. In this regard, the rise of private security, 
including the widespread use of barriers, reflects an 
inward-looking mentality that reinforces marginalised 
and disempowered citizenship.
Overall, the effects outlined above suggest that physical 
barriers have tended to contribute towards:
•	 Reinforcing existing socio-spatial divisions between 
the rich and poor, and the inner-city and the periphery.
•	 Intensifying existing infrastructure and service deficits 
between well-served and securitised high-income 
neighbourhoods and ill-served and insecure low-
income neighbourhoods and katchi abadis.
•	 Exacerbating the underlying social tensions and 
ethnic divisions that are fuelling violent conflict across 
the city.
•	 Impeding public mobility and accessibility, with 
disproportionate consequences for women, domestic 
workers, and informal vendors.
•	 Encroaching and consuming public space while 
privatising its management and control, often for 
commercial gain.
•	 Discouraging citizens from engaging the state in 
finding alternative solutions; and
•	 Allowing the state to further remove itself from its 
responsibility to provide security and to engage in 
urban planning.
Two important questions emerge from the above: if 
physical barriers have become an inescapable reality, 
despite the effects above, than what ought to be 
done about them, if anything? Are alternative means 
of guaranteeing security required, and if so, which are 
most suitable and who must be involved? The following 
concluding section addresses these questions.
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4 
Conclusions and 
recommendations
In the absence of alternatives, physical barriers have 
become the dominate means of security deployed by 
both public and private actors throughout Karachi. This 
is likely to remain the case so long as the state remains 
unable to effectively intervene in both policing and 
urban planning.
Despite the ineffectiveness of the state, two important 
opportunities may be emerging for municipal 
governments to promote safer and more secure spaces. 
The first involves planning and managing physical 
barriers in more effective and equitable ways, while the 
second involves supporting alternative means of security 
for the poorest and most insecure groups. This section 
presents two recommendations aimed at supporting 
these respective opportunities. Importantly, both 
recommendations adopt a spatial lens in addressing 
insecurity and its effects on different communities and 
groups of people. But they also address the limited 
capacity of the authorities, and their difficulties in 
maintaining neutrality in attempting to intervene. These 
recommendations are as follows.
Support municipal platforms for planning and 
managing physical barriers more effectively and 
equitably – Most physical barriers in Karachi have 
been illegally constructed without planning approval by 
the Sindh Building Control Authority (SBCA). In other 
cases, barriers among other infrastructure improvements 
have been approved and even co-financed by municipal 
authorities and utility companies, but this has been 
limited to higher-income neighbourhoods (Kaker 2014).
On the other hand, the use of barriers and other 
contestation mechanisms in lower-income 
neighbourhoods and katchi abadis has been 
discouraged by municipal authorities who view these 
neighbourhoods as hotbeds of crime, violence and 
terrorism. However, their residents face heightened 
security threats as well as police harassment and 
neglect (Gayer 2014; Masud 2002; Ring 2006).
Efforts to redress the burdens created by physical 
barriers have been similarly inequitable. In 2009, the 
Sindh government tasked the rangers with removing 
illegally constructed barriers. These efforts have 
been vigorously contested by ordinary citizens and 
other stakeholders demanding alternative means 
of security before the barriers are removed (Khan 
2013). Residents in barricaded localities argue that 
they have no alternatives to such self-help measures 
since the government and law enforcement agencies 
appear incapable of upholding security (Dawn News 
2008). The fact that barriers around embassies and 
government institutions (including police stations, see 
Figure 27) have not been removed also alludes to their 
continuing importance in the absence of alternatives.
Rather than simply promoting the removal of barriers, 
a more useful approach would be to plan and manage 
them in ways that maximise their benefits and minimise 
their burdens for all affected groups. As the agency 
responsible for the provision of municipal services, 
the KMC has a clear role to play in coordinating the 
municipal planning efforts required to achieve this 
objective. This requires close engagement with the 
SBCA, which is responsible for the enforcement of 
planning and building regulations, but which has neither 
the capacity nor political will to do so (Hasan et al. 
2015, p. 51). 
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There is great hope that the reinstatement of local 
elections in Karachi’s six cantonments3 initially 
scheduled for September 2015 will present new 
opportunities to empower municipal institutions and 
to build their capacity to engage in more accountable, 
representative, and less politicised urban planning 
and governance processes. Ideally, this would 
allow municipal governments to reclaim space as a 
public security concern. At the time of this writing, 
however, these elections were further postponed for 
political reasons.
But even if local elections were held, the widespread 
corruption and politicisation of key government 
institutions, including the police and urban planning, 
raise serious questions concerning whether stronger 
local institutions will be capable of transcending the 
ethnic politics that have historically governed the city 
and fueled its violent conflict. There is a risk that local 
elections would simply reproduce political biases at 
the cantonment level, further contributing to existing 
social tensions and ethnic divisions both within and 
between communities. If these politics can be overcome 
by local councilors and administrators, then important 
opportunities to plan and manage barriers more 
effectively and equitably may arise. If so, key planning 
considerations would include:
•	 Ensure inclusivity in planning processes so that the 
needs and priorities of all affected groups – including 
ethnic minorities, informal vendors, domestic workers, 
residents of low-income neighbourhoods, and other 
marginal groups (women and men) – are considered. 
Involving a local non-governmental organisation – 
such as the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP)4 – with prior 
experience in conflict resolution and community 
mobilisation could help to support this. For example, 
the OPP has proven effective in helping community 
leaders to find amicable solutions to conflict between 
Muhajirs and Pashtuns (The Express Tribune 2013).
•	 Leverage private investment for public benefit 
by requiring applicants seeking municipal approval 
to demonstrate that their proposed security 
arrangements, including barriers, will have public 
benefits or at the very least avoid adverse impacts 
on the public realm. In areas of the city where social 
tensions and ethnic divisions are high, alternative 
means of guaranteeing security may be required, as 
addressed by the following recommendation.
Co-produce citizen-police security solutions at 
the community level – Orangi, Korangi (and Landhi), 
Baldia and Lyari are among the city’s largest peri-
urban settlements. However, they have become 
virtually ungovernable due to their invisibility to urban 
Figure 27. Arm lever blocking road leading to the Aziz Bhatti Police Station in Gulshan Iqbal
Photo Credit: Authors
3 Cantonments were formerly military installations that have gradually evolved into settled areas. Previously, they were controlled by cantonment boards as 
principal decision-making bodies. Today, cantonments are local government systems mandated with the management of land, municipal service provision and 
revenue generation through taxation. Local government elections have not been held in the cantonments since 2000. In 2014, changes were made to the 
Cantonment Board Act of 1924 to make it easier to hold free and fair elections in them (see Anwar 2015).
4 The OPP-RT is a local NGO established in 1989 to work with residents of katchi abadis in Karachi and other cities in Pakistan to develop and finance low 
cost infrastructure (particularly related to sanitation) and housing solutions. The OPP-RT has proven effective in developing partnerships between marginalised 
communities and municipal authorities in local planning and infrastructure provision (see Hasan 2006).
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administrators. The Taliban have also become de 
facto public authorities in many of these settlements, 
establishing their own parallel justice systems (Gayer 
2014, p. 184). This has put the Taliban into direct 
conflict with political parties (notably the MQM) and 
other armed groups seeking to carve out their own 
sovereign spaces in the city (ibid).
As the military capacity of armed groups has increased, 
the ability of the police to uphold law and order has 
further decreased (Masud 2002). The police remain 
hindered by inadequate funding5, organised crime, 
politicisation (particularly regarding patronage), 
and the ethnic composition of its force (traditionally 
dominated by Punjabis and Pathans). Higher-income 
groups generally believe that the police have failed in 
law enforcement, while the poor view the police as an 
instrument of harassment (ibid).
In an effort to bridge the gap between the police and 
citizens, the Sindh government established Citizen-
Police Liaison Committees (CPLCs) in 1989 as non-
political statutory institution operated and managed 
independently by concerned citizens (Centre for 
Peace and Development Initiatives 2014; Masud 
2002). CPLCs possess the legal basis (as prescribed 
by Amended Rule 1.21A of the Police Rules 19346) 
to interact with the police to carry out a number of 
core functions:
1. To satisfy that the First Information Reports (FIRs) 
on crime are duly registered and no FIR is refused 
illegally. (The FIR is a criminal procedure that 
initiatives the criminal justice system. Any victim or 
witness to a crime has the right to lodge a FIR with 
the police for them to investigate. Investigations of 
serious crimes require a FIR)
2. To determine if dilatory tactics are being adopted by 
the police officers in investigating cases.
3. To collect statistics on various criminal cases.
4. To check if all registers in police stations are being 
properly and regularly maintained.
5. To insure that no person is unlawfully detained at any 
police station.
6. To assist the police in preserving peace and assist in 
detection and prevention of crime.
7. To report any misconduct or neglect of duty on the 
part of any police officer.
8. To perform such other functions as may be assigned 
by the government.
While most of these functions entail oversight, the 
CPLC provides critical inputs into law enforcement 
in practice. Masud (2002, p. 12) identifies at least 
seven areas where the CPLC has enhanced police 
performance:
1. Problem identification and solution.
2. Improving police procedures.
3. Improving the ‘economics of investigation’.
4. Improving the monitoring of law enforcement on the 
ground.
5. Setting standards.
6. Putting accountability mechanisms in place.
7. Providing access to justice for the poor.
In particular, the CPLC have improved policing for 
the poor by enhancing citizen oversight, raising 
accountability in the face of corruption and politicisation 
and providing a forum for resolving disputes (eg 
financial transactions, landlord-tenant issues, land 
grabbing, domestic issues, etc) outside costly judicial 
processes (ibid). Ideally, local elections would present 
additional opportunities for councilors and the mayor 
of Karachi to liaise with the authorities to enhance local 
representation, accountability and citizen engagement in 
community policing. It would also present opportunities 
to engage the private sector as one of the largest 
financial contributors to CPLCs (Pryjomko 2011).
However, as cautioned above, there is no guarantee 
that stronger and more accountable local institutions 
will make urban administrators or the police force any 
less susceptible to corruption or political patronage. 
Ultimately, if the ethnic and religious/sectarian politics 
that continue to govern the city are overlooked, then 
planning and policing interventions (whether involving 
barriers or alternative mechanisms) may reproduce 
existing social tensions and ethnic divisions. Thus, any 
future effort seeking to enhance the city’s safety and 
security situation cannot be viewed in isolation from 
these enduring politics.
5 The average police station in Pakistan has an annual operating budget, exclusive of additional staff costs, of only 8,000 rupees (USD$120) (Masud 2002, citing 
the Asian Development Bank).
6 Government of Sindh Notification V111(3)SOJ/90 dated 15/04/1990.
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Annex I – Workshop 
information
Three workshops were held in Karachi to disseminate 
the findings and outcome of the study and to screen the 
video documentary. 
The first workshop was held on 6 March 2015 at the 
Urban Resource Centre. The participants included 
community activists, workers of community-based 
organisations, university students, and some members 
of the media. There were many comments received 
during the event. The audience was concerned with the 
status of the poor safety and security situation in the 
peri-urban areas of the city. They argued that while the 
middle income and affluent neighbourhoods in the city 
had exercised the option of installing physical barriers, 
the same option was not available to residents of 
squatters and peri-urban areas. The presence of various 
interest groups and armed outfits prevented people 
from implementing any self-help solution for common 
safety and security.
The second workshop was held on 20 March 2015 at 
NED University of Engineering and Technology, where 
the audience was made up of architects, engineers, 
students, and members of civil society. Apprehension 
was raised at the dismal situation of safety and security; 
however the participants expressed their concerns 
on the increase in barriers and gated communities. 
It was generally agreed that these informal physical 
interventions in public spaces are not the answer 
to security problems. Improved local governance 
and community monitoring were argued as the 
better options.
The third workshop was also held at NED University 
on 22 May 2015. The target audience was media 
personnel, and there was overall agreement amongst 
participants that physical barriers should not be 
treated as a universal solution to security issues. The 
media agreed to report on and analyse related issues, 
such as the use of barriers as an instrument of land 
grabbing and the illegal restriction of public spaces from 
ordinary use. 
An Urdu language pamphlet was prepared based 
upon the key findings and recommendations of the 
study and disseminated to community groups in 
Orangi, Baldia and Liaquatabad neighbourhoods. 
The participants of these discussions, which took 
place between the authors and area residents during 
August and September 2015, generally agreed with the 
contents and recommendations of the report. All the 
groups were of the view that physical barriers are not 
permanent solutions to issues of security. It is clear that 
administrative and political solutions have to be found 
through consultation and further research. 
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